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fer, or the circumstances are equivocal as to which one of the
two commenced the affair, it is
highly relevant to admit in evidence the previous threats of the
deceased, to be taken into consideration by the jury with'the other
facts of the case, as tending to show
the intention of the defendant to
act when the opportunity occurred :
People v. Arnold, 15 Col., 476;
Wiggins v. People, 93 U. S., 465;
Turpin v. State, 55 Md., 462; State
v. Turpin, 77 N. C., 473; State v..
Alexander, 66 Mo., 148; State v.
Hall, 9 Nev. 58. But there must
be direct proof of some encounter
or affray between the parties in
order that uncommunicated threats
may be received: Hoye v. State, 39
Ga., 718; Lingo v. Ga., 29 Ga., 470.
If the deceased did nothing in the
conflict but defend himself, then
the evidence is irrelevant; Lingo
v. Ga., 29 Ga., 470.
In Nevelling v. Com., 98 Pa.,
336, the Supreme Court of Penn-

sylvania said, concerning evidence
of this character: "It was no part
of the resgestar, it was not even
alleged that the evidence was communicated to Nevelling, and it was
altogether inapt to a defence of
mental incapacity. Had there been
any evidence of an affiray at the
time ofshooting, and had the threat,
such as it was, been communicated
to Nevelling, it might have been
admissible, though of very little
real weight in the case."
To quote the language of Mr.Justice MiLLER, it is evident after this
brief review of so broad a field that:
"Where the question is as to what
the attitude of the deceased was at
the time of the fatal encounter, recent threats may become relevant
to show that this attitude was hostile to the defendant, even though
such threats were not communicated to defendant." Wiggins v.
People (supra), Southern Law Review, June, 1878, p. 261 ; Wharton's
Crim. Ev., 757.
JOHN A. MCCARTHY.
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STATE TAXATION OF CORPORATE FRANCHISES AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
DURING the last two years there have been many decisions affecting the commerce clause of the Constitution.
The most important are those which develop the doctrine
of' the States' right to tax corporate franchises. It is of
these we desire to treat in this note.
The right of incorporation is a privilege of value apart
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-from the value of the property invested in the corporation. As said by Mr. Justice FIELD: " Its (a corporation's)
creation, except where the corporation is sole, is the investing of two or more persons with the capacity to act as a
single individual, with a common name, and the privilege
of succession in its members without dissolution, and with
a limited individual liability. The right and privilege, or
the franchise, as it may be called, is of great value to its
members, and is considered as property separate and distinct
from the property which the corporation itself may acquire
according to the law of most of the States. Thus the franchise or privilege of being a corporation is deemed personal
.property, and is subject to separate taxation."'
A corporation organized under the laws of one State
has noi the right to carry on business in another without
the'c6nsent of the latter. This principle was established
in the leading cases of the Bank of Augusta v. Earle,2 and
also in Paul v. Virginia.'
To this assertion, that a State can prohibit a corpora-

tion organized under the laws of another State fr(m,doing
, business within her borders, there is certainly one and possibly two exceptions. The first and undoubted' exception
is where the corporation is in the employ of the gen&ral
government. "If," said Mr. Justice BRADLEY, in Stockton
v. Balto. & N. Y. R. R.,4 "Congress hould employ a corporation of ship builders to construct a man-of-war, they
would have the right to purchase the necessary iron in any
State of the Union." And in the Pembria Mining Co. v.
Pehna.,5 the Supreme Court added, "without the permission and against the prohibition of the State." The second
"and perhaps-doubtful exception is where th corporation is
carrying on interstate commerce, and has been expressly
authorized by Congress to carry on that business in any
'Opinion in JHorn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, x43 U. S.,
323 (1892).
2 13 Pet., 519 (839).
3 8 Wall., 168 (I868).
4 32 Fed. Rep., 9, 14 (1887).
6 125 U. S., I8I, 186 (1888).
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State of the Union. This last was decided in Pensacola
Tel. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co.1 The Act of the 24 th of July
r866; provided that any telegraph company organized or to
be organized under any State laws shall have the right to
construct, maintain, and operate 'lines of telegraph along
all the post roads of the United States. All the railroads
within the United States are post roads.2 The State of
Florida gave exclusive permission to a company to operate
telegraph lines within the State. The Court, through Mr.
Chief Justice WAIT.E, held that Congress has the right to
confer on persons or corporations the right to carry on interstate commerce, and that when it has done so, any interference with this right by a State is unconstitutional. Justices FIELD and HUNT dissented, on the ground that the
Act of Congress in question did not pretend to confer the
right of a telegraph company, organized under the laws of
one State, to operate telegraph lines on other than the public domains. But from the language used on page 19 it is
evident that Mr. Justice FIELD considered that Congress
has no power to confer on a corporation, organized under
the laws of one State, the right to enter another State on
interstate business. He says: "Never has it been suggested
that the United States could enable a corporation of 6ne
State to condemn property in another State, in order
that it may transact its private business there."
He,
eyen appeared to doubt the power of Congress to establish a railroad
I
Mr. Justice HARLAN did not sit on the case. All who
formed the majority are now dead. And though, from the
,opinion in California v. Pacific Railroad Co., 4 one may consider the right of Congress to establish a railroad as conclusively settled, we have no means of knowing whether
196 U. S., 1, 12 (I877).
2 Rev. Stats, 3964; 17 Stat., 306, 201.
3 See also Elliot's Debates, ed. of 1836, 433,487; Views of President
Mtlonroe, accompanying hi&veto message of May 3, 1832; Views ofJudge
McLEAN, in his dissenting opinion in the Wheeling Bridge Case, I8 How-,
44I, 442.
4 127

U. S., i (1887}.
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the new members of the bench would not agree with Mr,
Justice FIELD in limiting the federal power to delegate to
corporations the power of eminent domain for purposes of
interstate commerce'to corporations created by the laws of
Congress. Neither is it clear from the recent decisions
whether a corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce; apart from the question of eminent domain, can carry
on its business in other States Than the one of its incorporation,.without the permission of such States. In every case
which has come before the Court the corporation has
admitted that it was also engaged in other business beside
that of interstate commerce. .Thus, in.the late case of Horn
Silver Mining Co. v. New York,1 where the absolute right to,
enter a State other than the one of its incorporation was
claimed by a company, the Court held that the declaration
of the cbmpany that they were a manifacturing corporation
in New York was an admission that they were engaged in
the State of New York in other than interstate business.
. One thing seems, however, to be certain. A corporation organized under the laws of one'State cannlof, though
engaged in interstate commerce, exercise the right of
eminent domain in another State without its permission or
the permission of Congress, express or implied. 2
Therefore, we may start out with the proposition that
for the purpose of doing interstate commerce, of for the
right to exercise eminent domain even solely for the purpose of interstate commerce, a corporation must knock at
the- doors of the State' legislature whose territory they
deire to enter, and the legislature has the 'right to refuse
them. This at present being granted, is a State legislature
restricted by the Constitution in the conditibns for admission which it can impose on a corporation.?
In Barron v. Burnside,3 the Court, while refusing to
enter into the question whether a statute was constitu143 U. S., 305 (i892).
"2Maine v. Grand Trunk R. R. Co., 142 U. S.,

217

(189i).

But see.

Lyons Thomas Hardware Co. v. Reading Hardwqre Co., -Ct. of Civil.
Appeals of Tex., 21 S. W. Rep., 3oo. (Supra p. 5o4). Decided Feb. 7, 1893121 U. S., 186 (1887).
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tional, which required a corporation engaged in interstate
commerce to obtain a permit from the State before it would
be permitted to carry on business, held that "no conditions can be imposed by the State which are repugnant to
the Constitution of the United States," 1and that a condition that suits against the corporation should not be transferred to the Federal Courts was a condition which tended
to deny to the corporation rights secured by the Constitution.
It would seem by analogy that the right to carry on
interstate commerce unrestrained by State legislation was
one of the rights impliedly guaranteed in the Constitution,
and that, even though a State might refuse to admit a corporation engaged in interstate commerce to act in the State,
the State could not cripple with its consent conditions
which tended to burden and impede the interstate commerce to be carried on by the corporation.
And yet this argument has not always, and does not
now, appeal to the Court. In the case of Balto. & 0. R. R.
v. Md.,2 the statute of the State, which conferred the right
to construct the railroad in Maryland, provided that the
railroad should have the right to charge a price from Baltimore to Washington not greater than $2 per passenger, and
that one-fifth of the whole amount of money received from
carrying passengers from Baltimore to Washington and
intermediate points should go to the State.
Yet Mr.
jiistice BRADLEY upheld this on the express ground that,
"So long as it is conceded (as it seems to us it must be)
that the power to charge for transportation, and the
amount of the charge, are absolutely within the control of
the State, how can it matter what is done with the money,
whether it goes to the State or to the stockholders of a
private corporation?"
And the reason for this is "that
the State could have built the road itself, and charged any
rate it chose, and could have filled the coffers of its
treasury without having been questioned therefor." 3 The
IOp. Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD,
221

Wall., 456 (1874).

SOp., pp. 47, 472.

p. 250.
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great constitutional lawyer here first lays down the principle,
whose logical application to a slightly different state of
facts called forth his last and mbst vigorous dissent.1
Previous to this the Court had held that a tax placed"
on the railroad after its corporation, on every passenger
carried out of the State, was-invalid,' .and it is now beyondquestion that a State cannot -regulate the rates of fare or
freight from points outside t6 points inside the State, or
3

vice versa.

And yet in the Delaware R. R. Tax ' the Court carriec
'the doctrine of the right of a State to impose conditions on'
the exercise of a franchise one step further; and held- that a
State, subsequent to the incorporation of the company and
the grant of its.right of way, could tax the company's franchises, and the tax would be measured by the amount of
the net receipts. of the railroad. In the particular dqse,
only a portion of the net receipts were taken, which pro"portibn was measured, by the relative number of the miles
of-'road inthe State to the whole number operated by the
company. Yet this fact would not have made ahy difference in the decision, for Mr. JusticeFISLD says: "The State
may impose taxes upon the corporation as an entity exist-

ing under its laws, as well as upon the capital stock of the
corporation, or its- separate corporate property. -And the
Imanner in which its value shall be assessed, and the rate of
taxatiobi, however arbitrary or capri~ious, are mere matters
of legislative discretion.'? This case not only upholds the
tight of a State to tax the'net receipts from interstate com-merce' but also its right to place a tax varying 'in amount
according to the actual cash value of the capital stock, even

though most 9 f the property of the company: is outside the
State. As the Court had decided that a -tax on the actual
value of the capital stock of a corporation was a tax on the,
property of the compaly, the case must be considered as.
1
2

See Ifra, and 31 Am. L. R.PG. & REv., 203.
CrandaU v. Nevada, 6 Wall., 35 (1867).

'Wabash, etc., R. R. v. Ill., 118 U. S. 557 (1885).
4i8 Wall., 2o6 (1873).
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unintentionally overruling the decision in the leading case of
Bank of Commerce v. New York,' where it was held that a
tax on the actual cash value of the stock of a corporation
was void, in so far as the corporation had invested in United
States bonds. However, in the Delaware case, it was considered a tax on franchise, and by that magical word, a tax
otherwise bad, as a tax on interstate commerce, or on property outside the jurisdiction of the State was made good.
In the case of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the State of
Maryland, having the right to refuse to charter the corporation, the State could impose, as a condition of the charter,
that the rates of interstate fare should not exceed a certain
sum, and that part of the revenue from the interstate traffic
should pass to the coffers of the State; and in the Delaware
case it was held that since the road could have refused to
charter, after they had chartered, the value of this right to.
act as a corporation could be taxed according to the valueof the corporate property held outside of the State, or the
amount of interstate business done by the corporation.
The recent case of Grand Trunk R. R. v. Maine 2 is
on- all fours with this decision of the Delaware Railroad
Tax Case. The Maine tax was in terms for the privilege
of operating a railroad within the State. The amount of
the tax was determined by two factors-the amount of the
gross receipts, and the proportion of the number of miles in.
the State to the whole number of miles operated by therailroad. The Court upleld the tax, four judges dissenting..
The ground of the dissent was that the tax was a regula-tion of commerce. Judge FIELD delivered the opinion,
taking the same ground which he had taken in the Delaware7
case years before, to wit: That is was nothing but a fair
way of getting at the value of the franchise, as fair as
charging a lump sum for it, and, therefore, the Act was
constitutional.
The' case of the Horn Silver Mining Company v. New
York,' before mentioned, was decided on grounds similar to.
12 Back, 620 (1862).
1142 U. S., 2x7 (1891).

3'43 U. S., 221 (1891).
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the Maine case. The State of New York taxed all corporations doing businiess in the State according to the dividends
on -their capital stock, or,. where no dividends were paid or
dividends less than a certain amount, on the actual value of
the capital stock. Most of the property of the corporation
was outside the State, and little of its business was transacted
in the State. The Court, however, through Mr. Justice
PIELD, considered the tax as- on the franchise, and the
mode of assessing the value of the franchise as fair.
In most of these cases two decisions are generally cited
as laying down the principle which controls the decision.
The first case is that of Paul v. Virginia,' where the State
law required foreign insurance companies to'deposit a certain sum with the State treasurer before they could transact
business. But there can be no possible qbjection to such a
law. The amount of money to be deposited did not lepend
on the value of the company's property in other States, or
the amount of business which it did in other States.
The other case is that of the Home Insurance Company
v 'New York, 2 on which the Maine decision is so largely
based. There a law of New York was involved which
tAxed a foreign corporation on the dividends and the par
value of the capital -stock. Some of the capital 'stbck'of
the insurance -company was invested in United States
bonds. The company, claiming that the tax was a tax on
the stock, demanded a reduction fkro lanto for the bonds.
This was nmistaken ground. The tax was not on the stock,
but on the dividends according to their amount., It was a
tax not on the property, but on the business of the corporation.
Had the law been attacked on the ground that the
business of the company was partly outside the State and,
nevertheless, the law had been upheld, then it would be a
case in point.
The Court in the Horn Silver Mining case also
apparently employ an argument which in Ficklen v. Shelby
18 Wall., i6 (1868).
2

134 U. S., 594 (1889).
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Co.' is made the basis of a decision.

Mr. Justice FrEI.D, in

the New York case, seems to admit that had the business
of the company been exclusively interstate commerce, the
company would have had an absolute right to enter the
State, and the tax on the franchise would then be unconstitutional. Part of the opinion is based on the admission
of the company that the Horn Silver Company was a manufacturing corporation in the State of New York. Therefore, for the right to do a business w%'hich was not interstate
commerce a tax could be levied which varied in amount
according to the amount of interstate business the company
did. In the Shelby Taxing case above cited, the Court
held that a license tax on all brokers, varying according to
the amount of their commission on sales, was constitutional,
even though part of these sales were of the products of
other States, provided part were of the products of the
State imposing the tax. The tax is considered valid, though
in effect a tax on- interstate commerce, because it is in
terms for permission to do interstate business. On this
reasoning A could be taxed in Pennsylvania for real estate
owned in Ohio as a charge for a license to carry on any retail
trade. The Court say that the case does not affect their
decision in Robbins v. Shelby Co. Tax,' where it was held
that a tax on an agent of a house outside the State of so much
per week for permission to sell the goods of his firm is unconstitutional. It cannot but be hoped that in this last case
the Court has not intentionally modified the important
principle established by this first case, and that a tax for
the sale of goods imported from other States, and still in
the original package, is unconstitutional; but we fear, with
Mr. Justice HARLAN, " that the present decision will be
cited as having that effect."
At the same time that the doctrine was being developed that a State has a right, in valuing the franchise of
a corporation, to tax the interstate business of the company or the value of the property outside the State, cases
1 145 U. S., i (iS 9 ).
2 12a U. S., 489 (1886).
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in which the terms of *theAct have not called attention
to the fact that it could be upheld, as a tax on the franchise,
have been drifting toward the principle that a tax -falls
on that on which its amount depends. In. other words'
that it falls on that phenomenon on which it is graded.
the rule which is being universally applied to persons
other than corporate persons, has also, in many instances,
been applied to corporations. Thus, in the case of the
StAte Freight Tax,' a tax graded on the amount of freight
,carried by corporations, was held to be. a. tax on the
business of carrying, freight, and void -as far as it fell on
.freight taken from points inside to points outside the State,
8r vicL- versa. The value of this decision to the freedom of
interstate commerce'was temporarily greatly impaired by
that in the next case of the tax on railroad gross receipts?
-it was here held that a tax on the gross receipts of a trans. portation company was valid, even though the business was
principally inter-state commerce, for the re'ason that the tax
.did not fall on the company until the money for the transpor"tation had been paid and was within the treasury,-and, there,fore, it could be upheld as a tax on the money or property
within the State. The fa& that it might beconsidered as a
_.tax on the franchise was also considered, but the principal.
ground was the one first mentioned.
This case was overruled by that of the Southern
Steamship Company v. Pennsylvania,' where it was held

that a tax on the gross receipts of a steamship company
was invalid in so far as it fell on the receipts received from
carniage of interstate or foreign freight.
Mr. justice FIELD declares that the, case of the Maine
statute is totally different from the case of. the Pennsylvania statute. The only reason given is that the tax in the
latter was "in terms" on the gross receipts. It is true
that the Maine statute was "in terms" on the franchise.
That is the only difference between the two statutes,
1 IS Wall., 232 (1872).
2 15 Wall., 284 (1872).,
122 U. S., 326 (1886).
(x886).

See also Fargo

v. Mich., 121 U.- S., 230
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except that in the Maine cas the tax for one year was
measured by the amount of freight carried during the previous year, while in the Pennsylvania case the amount for
the current year was the basis of the law. In the Maine
law the tax on all the gross receipts was reduced by the
.proportion of mileage of the line which was outside of the
State. This was undoubtedly done to give the Act validity,
but that it was an unnecessary precaution is seen in the case
of the Horn Silver Mining Company,' where, as we have
pointed out, the entire gross receipts of a company were
successfully taxed for the privilege of doing State business,
though practically the sole business done in the State was
interstate business, and the majority of the company's
business and capital were outside of the State.
This doctrine of the valuation of the franchise by the
business of the company we cannot but believe will ultimately be abandoned by the Court. It enables the States
by a word to make a tax otherwise invalid, valid. This
must be seen b'y the Court. Either they will modify the
'doctrines of the taxation of commerce previously held, or
modify the recent decisions as to the power'of a State to
tax franchises.
It may seem, at first glance, as absurd to say that a
State can charge a lump sum for its franchise to a corporation, or so much per year, and yet not be able to grade the
value of the franchise to each company according to the
amount of business it does in other States, or the amount
of its property. It is a plausible argument which tells us
that this method of valuation is a fair way of getting at
what a State confers on a company when it permits it to
act as a corporation in the State. And yet, under cover of a
franchise tax "in terms," has not, as a practical matter of
fact, the State of Maine taxed corporations on the amount of
interstate commerce hauled through the State, and the State
of New York taxed b company because it had property
situated in Utah and carried on business in Illinois?
It is true that a franchise is more valuable to a rich
S143 U. S., 305 (i89r.

